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We study how the level of unemployment insurance (UI) benefits that trades off the consumption smoothing
benefit with the moral hazard cost of distorting job search behavior varies over the business cycle.
Empirically, we find that the moral hazard cost is procyclical, greater when the unemployment rate
is relatively low. By contrast, our evidence suggests that the consumption smoothing benefit of UI
is acyclical. Using these estimates to calibrate our model, we find that a one standard deviation increase
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It is commonly accepted that raising unemployment insurance (UI) bene￿ts lengthens un-
employment spells (Hamermesh 1977, Mo¢ tt 1985, Meyer 1990, Chetty 2008). Higher
UI bene￿ts also help smooth consumption, with estimates suggesting modest consumption
smoothing bene￿ts (Gruber 1997, Browning and Crossley 2001). This evidence comes from
empirical studies that do not distinguish between changes in bene￿ts when labor market
conditions are good and changes in bene￿ts when labor market conditions are poor. If the
consumption smoothing bene￿t and moral hazard cost of UI depend on labor market condi-
tions, this may imply that unemployment bene￿ts should respond to shifts in labor demand.
However, many of the studies that conduct a welfare analysis of UI do not consider whether
and to what extent UI bene￿ts should vary with labor market conditions (Baily 1978, Gru-
ber 1997, Hopenhayn and Nicolini 1997, Chetty 2006, 2008, Shimer and Werning 2007, Kroft
2008, Lentz 2009). As Alan Krueger and Bruce Meyer (2002, p64-65) remark:
[F]or some programs, such as UI, it is quite likely that the adverse incentive
e⁄ects vary over the business cycle. For example, there is probably less of an e¢ -
ciency loss from reduced search e⁄ort by the unemployed during a recession than
during a boom. As a consequence, it may be optimal to expand the generosity
of UI during economic downturns ... Unfortunately, this is an area in which little
empirical research is currently available to guide policymakers.
Similarly, the Congressional Budget O¢ ce writes that the availability of long-term unem-
ployment bene￿ts ￿could dampen people￿ s e⁄orts to look for work, [but that concern] is less
of a factor when employment opportunities are expected to be limited for some time.￿ 1
This paper investigates how the optimal UI bene￿t level ￿which we de￿ne throughout
the paper as the UI bene￿t level that trades o⁄ the consumption smoothing bene￿t and the
moral hazard cost ￿varies over the business cycle. We consider a standard job model that
has recently been used to evaluate optimal UI (Shimer and Werning 2007, Chetty 2008).
In this model, we derive a formula for the marginal welfare gain of UI that illustrates the
standard trade-o⁄ between the consumption smoothing bene￿t of UI and the moral hazard
1The CBO quote is available from the following URL: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/03/08/AR2010030804927_pf.html.
1cost of UI. Following prior work, we show that this formula is expressible purely in terms
of estimable elasticities. We depart from the prior literature by explicitly allowing these
elasticities to depend on the unemployment rate. Identifying the relationship between these
elasticities and the unemployment rate is therefore su¢ cient to characterize optimal UI over
the business cycle. This is the objective of our analysis.
Since we state our formula in terms of reduced-form elasticities, our analysis is in the
spirit of the ￿su¢ cient statistics￿approach (Chetty 2009). The primary advantages of this
approach are that it is simple to implement and it does not place restrictions on the model
primitives. For example, our welfare analysis captures the liquidity bene￿t of UI (and
how this bene￿t varies over the cycle) without having to model liquidity constraints explic-
itly. Additionally, our welfare analysis is valid for a wide range of underlying mechanisms
which cause the duration elasticity and the consumption smoothing bene￿t to vary with the
unemployment rate.2 Most importantly, our welfare analysis does not require separately
identifying how reservation wages and search e⁄ort respond to a change in bene￿ts and how
these behavioral responses vary over the cycle. We demonstrate why this is important by
showing that a ￿xed e⁄ort, reservation wage model and a ￿xed wage, search e⁄ort model can
give rise to very di⁄erent predictions about optimal UI over the cycle.
To see part of the intuition for this result, consider the cyclicality of the duration elasticity.
We show that there are two opposing forces in the standard search model that shape how
this varies over the cycle. On the one hand, in a downturn, the job o⁄er arrival rate or labor
demand is less responsive to an increase in labor supply or search e⁄ort. This causes the
duration elasticity to be smaller in a recession and is related to the speculation of Krueger
and Meyer (2002) above. On the other hand, when labor demand is low, a worker values an
increase in the bene￿t level more, since she expects to collect UI for some time. This acts
to increase the duration elasticity in a recession. Which e⁄ect dominates depends on the
assumptions placed on the structural parameters, as we discuss more fully below. We also
exploit the structure of our job search model to show that the cyclicality of the consumption
2Chetty (2009) describes the advantages and disadvantages of the su¢ cient statistics approach in more
detail.
2smoothing bene￿t of UI is ambiguous.3
The theoretical ambiguity highlighted by the job search model indicates that how the
moral hazard cost and the consumption smoothing bene￿t of UI vary with labor market con-
ditions is ultimately an empirical question. This motivates our two-part empirical strategy,
which directly estimates each of these two terms. The ￿rst part of our empirical contribution
examines how the elasticity of unemployment duration with respect to the UI bene￿t level
varies with labor market conditions. We estimate a hazard model where the e⁄ect of the
UI bene￿t level on unemployment durations depends on the state unemployment rate. We
￿nd that the elasticity of unemployment durations with respect to the level of unemployment
bene￿ts is 0:563 at the average state unemployment rate, very similar to the estimate re-
ported in Chetty (2008). Our new empirical result is that the duration elasticity varies with
local labor market conditions; speci￿cally, we ￿nd that the duration elasticity is statistically
signi￿cantly lower when the state unemployment rate is relatively high. Furthermore, the
magnitude of this interaction e⁄ect is economically large: in our preferred speci￿cation, a one
standard deviation increase in the unemployment rate (an increase of 1:3 percentage points
from a base of 6:2%) reduces the magnitude of the duration elasticity from 0:563 to 0:304 (a
decline in magnitude of 46%).
The second part of our empirical contribution estimates how the consumption smoothing
bene￿t of UI varies with the unemployment rate. We estimate a model where the e⁄ect of UI
on the consumption change upon unemployment depends on the state unemployment rate.
We ￿nd that a ten percentage point increase in the UI replacement rate reduces the consump-
tion drop upon unemployment by 2.6% on average, very similar to the estimate reported in
Gruber (1997). In contrast to our duration elasticity results, we do not ￿nd evidence that the
consumption smoothing bene￿t of UI varies with the unemployment rate. Our estimate of
the consumption smoothing interaction e⁄ect is both economically and statistically insigni￿-
cant, and ￿though our statistical power is somewhat limited ￿we can rule out large e⁄ects.
As a complementary test, we also do not ￿nd evidence that our duration elasticity results
3To our knowledge, there are few papers that use a standard job search model to derive conditions under
which the behavioral responses to UI vary with the job o⁄er arrival rate. We discuss the connection between
our theoretical results and the related literature at the end of this section.
3are primarily due to liquidity e⁄ects varying with local labor market conditions. Putting
these two pieces together, they imply that the moral hazard cost of UI is procyclical while
the consumption smoothing bene￿t of UI is acyclical. These ￿ndings form the basis of our
conclusion that the optimal bene￿t level is decreasing in the unemployment rate.
The identi￿cation of both models comes from exploiting variation in UI bene￿ts within
states over time interacted with within- and between-state variation in the unemployment
rate. We pursue this time-series, cross-sectional research design using state unemployment
rates rather than a purely time-series design using the national unemployment rate in order to
have su¢ cient variation in UI bene￿t levels across a wide range of labor market conditions.4
An immediate concern with our empirical strategy is that when the state unemployment
rate is high, bene￿ts may (endogenously) increase. When bene￿ts respond to observed
and unobserved labor market conditions, we show that we will consistently estimate our
interaction term as long as the correlation between UI bene￿ts and labor market conditions
does not vary with the unemployment rate. When this condition is violated, estimates of
the interaction term of interest will su⁄er from endogeneity bias. We pursue three strategies
to address this concern.
First, we always measure the local unemployment rate relative to the national unemploy-
ment rate, and we control for this relative local unemployment rate directly in all speci￿ca-
tions. The use of relative unemployment rates alleviates the concern that UI bene￿t levels
respond to national business cycles. Additionally, if states raise UI bene￿ts in national reces-
sions, but do not systematically adjust bene￿ts in good times, then this strategy is preferable
to using absolute unemployment rates with year ￿xed e⁄ects, as we discuss below. By con-
trolling for the local unemployment rate in all speci￿cations, we address the concern that
bene￿ts may respond endogenously to local labor market conditions.
Second, we directly investigate the association between the state unemployment rate and
the maximum UI bene￿t level, and we ￿nd weak but suggestive evidence that they are
4Another advantage of our empirical strategy is that in both parts of the empirical analysis, we use the
same sample restrictions and empirical speci￿cations from Chetty (2008) and Gruber (1997) in our baseline
speci￿cations. Although the samples and speci￿cations vary across these two papers, we minimize issues of
data and speci￿cation mining, as our baseline sample restrictions and empirical speci￿cations are essentially
￿pre-speci￿ed￿by the previous literature.
4positively correlated. Moreover, our evidence weakly suggests that the positive association
is stronger when the unemployment rate is relatively high. This implies that bene￿ts may
respond more strongly to local labor market conditions during bad times. We illustrate with
a simple model that this type of di⁄erential correlation between the unemployment rate and
UI bene￿ts works against our ￿ndings. In particular, any omitted variables bias due this
type of policy endogeneity will make the duration elasticity arti￿cially larger during times of
high unemployment; however, we ￿nd the opposite result: the duration elasticity is smaller
when the local unemployment rate is relatively high.
Third, we investigate several alternative identifying assumptions to gauge the magnitude
of omitted variables bias, and we ￿nd, if anything, that our results become stronger. First, we
include a ￿ exible polynomial in the state unemployment rate, which addresses the concern
that bene￿ts may vary non-linearly with the unemployment rate. Second, we include as
additional controls the interaction of the state unemployment rate with state ￿xed e⁄ects and
year ￿xed e⁄ects. This allows for a more ￿ exible correlation between observable local labor
demand shocks and UI bene￿ts. In particular, it captures the possibility that in certain states
and/or years, UI bene￿ts may be unusually responsive to changes in labor market conditions.
Third, we investigate alternative speci￿cations which allow for unobserved trends across states
within a region and within states over time. Lastly, we ￿nd stronger (though less precise)
results when we de￿ne local labor markets as metropolitan areas (MSAs) rather than states
and exploit purely across-MSA, within-state variation in unemployment rates, holding state
UI bene￿t levels constant. We therefore interpret our baseline estimates as a conservative
estimate of the magnitude of the relationship between the duration elasticity and the local
unemployment rate. We also investigate a wide variety of alternative explanations for this
￿nding, and we ￿nd no consistent evidence that the interaction e⁄ect we estimate is primarily
determined by composition bias, endogenous takeup, or bias from using both between-state
and within-state variation in state unemployment rates. Therefore, our interpretation of
the duration elasticity results is that they are most consistent with a negative relationship
between the moral hazard of cost of UI and the local unemployment rate.
5Combining our reduced form empirical estimates to calibrate the welfare-maximizing UI
bene￿t level implied by our model, we ￿nd that a one standard deviation increase in the
local unemployment rate leads to a roughly 14 to 27 percentage point increase in the wage
replacement rate, depending on the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion used in the calibration.5
To give a sense of the magnitude of a 14 percentage point change in the optimal replacement
rate at average levels of unemployment, it is roughly equivalent to the change in the optimal
UI bene￿t level stemming from a one unit change in the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion
(e.g., from ￿ = 3 to ￿ = 4), holding constant the duration elasticity and the e⁄ect of UI on
the consumption drop at unemployment.
Our results suggest that if policy makers are designing policy to equate the marginal
gain from consumption smoothing to the marginal cost of additional moral hazard, then UI
bene￿ts should be countercyclical. This is broadly consistent with the observed UI policy in
the U.S., which is based on extending the number of weeks for which an unemployed worker
can claim bene￿ts ￿typically 26 weeks. We show how one can use our elasticity estimates
to shed light on the optimality of current UI policy in the U.S., and we also provide an
illustration of how one may use our empirical results to shed light on how extending bene￿ts
in a recession a⁄ects the aggregate unemployment rate.
Our paper builds on and relates to several strands in the literature on optimal UI. First,
several papers have explored optimal UI over the business cycle theoretically. Kiley (2003)
and Sanchez (2008) consider the dynamic, discrete-time, search e⁄ort model in Hopenhayn
and Nicolini (1997). They impose particular functional forms on the job ￿nding probability to
ensure search e⁄ort and a variable a⁄ecting the job o⁄er arrival rate are highly complementary.
Under these functional forms, UI bene￿ts are more distortionary in good times than bad
times, and ￿ as a consequence ￿ optimal UI bene￿ts are unambiguously countercyclical.
Andersen and Svarer (2009) consider a static model and impose a similar functional form
assumption on the job ￿nding probability. Unlike the previous papers, they incorporate UI
￿nancing requirements and show that if the government budget must balance in each state,
bene￿ts could be procyclical due to a ￿budget e⁄ect￿ .
5Given the considerable uncertainty over the value of risk aversion, we report results across a range of
CRRA values from ￿ = 2 to ￿ = 4.
6Our contribution relative to these papers is to consider a more general dynamic search
model with stochastic wage o⁄ers, as in Shimer and Werning (2007) and Chetty (2008).
This framework allows us to shed light on several new dimensions of the optimal UI problem.
First, the model permits us to characterize the cyclical behavior of the behavioral responses of
both search e⁄ort and reservation wages. We demonstrate that a reservation wage model and
a search e⁄ort model deliver very di⁄erent predictions about the cyclicality of the duration
elasticity. Second, since our model nests other search models used in the literature, we
can use the model to zoom in on the distinctions between them. For example, our results
highlight that the response of search e⁄ort to UI bene￿ts over the cycle is pinned down
by three factors ￿(1) a static e⁄ort e⁄ect, (2) a dynamic e⁄ort e⁄ect and (3) a dynamic
reservation wage e⁄ect ￿and we show that these e⁄ects may go in opposite directions. To
our knowledge, previous studies have not highlighted this distinction.6
Another strand of the literature has begun to explore optimal UI over the business cycle
in a general equilibrium framework. Andersen and Svarer (2010) consider a stylized general
equilibrium model, and they demonstrate that allowing for changes in the business cycle
situation changes how the distortion to e⁄ort created by UI varies over the cycle, since search
e⁄ort depends on anticipated changes in the labor market. Another general equilibrium
approach is Landais, Michaillat, and Saez (2011), who consider a matching model with search
e⁄ort and focus on characterizing the optimal bene￿t level over the cycle. The primary
innovation in this paper is the introduction of endogenous job rationing coming through the
combination of diminishing marginal returns to production and wage rigidity. They derive
a version of the Baily-Chetty formula for optimal UI in terms of a ￿micro￿and ￿macro￿
elasticity, the latter capturing the direct e⁄ect of a change in UI bene￿ts on search and the
indirect e⁄ect that arises via changes in the aggregate job ￿nding rate. Though our model is
a partial equilibrium job search model, it can be reinterpreted as a general equilibrium model
following Rogerson, Shimer, and Wright (2005). More speci￿cally, one can interpret our
model as the Landais et al. model with the addition of reservation wages and the elimination
6For example, the typical textbook treatment (e.g., Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004)) simply notes that the
simultaneous lowering of the job ￿nding rate and the UI bene￿t level has an ambiguous e⁄ect on optimal
job search e⁄ort. By contrast, we provide analytical conditions, along with intuition, for the underlying
determinants of how the e⁄ort elasticity varies with the job o⁄er arrival rate
7of job rationing (which would be obtained by assuming constant returns to scale in production,
for example).
Finally, while we focus on the optimal level of UI bene￿ts over the business cycle, con-
temporaneous research by Schmieder, von Wachter and Bender (2011) explore theoretically
and empirically the optimal potential duration of UI bene￿ts over the cycle using unique ad-
ministrative data from Germany. We provide a detailed discussion of the di⁄erences between
the ￿ndings in this paper and our ￿ndings in section 3.1.5 below. Overall, we view our work
which focuses on the optimal bene￿t level as highly complementary to work which focuses
on optimal potential duration. An important task in future work will be to investigate the
problem of jointly choosing the optimal bene￿t level and potential duration over the business
cycle.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section develops the search
model and describes our su¢ cient statistics approach. Section 3 presents our empirical
analysis which estimates how the duration elasticity and consumption smoothing bene￿t of
UI vary with the unemployment rate. Section 4 considers the welfare implications of our
empirical ￿ndings. Section 5 concludes.
2 Theory
In this section, we present a standard continuous-time, in￿nite-time horizon, job search model.
The model nests the reservation wage model in Shimer and Werning (2007) and the search
e⁄ort model in Chetty (2008). For the complete set of analytical results, we refer the reader
to the Appendix. We limit the focus here to the setup of the model and a discussion of the
intuition underlying the main theoretical results.
2.1 Assumptions
We make several assumptions. First, we focus on bene￿t level, not potential bene￿t dura-
tion.7 Second, workers consume hand-to-mouth. Third, there is no value from leisure time
7Shimer and Werning (2008) ￿nd that socially optimal UI policy is in￿nite duration, constant bene￿ts in
a model with free access to savings and lending and CARA preferences.
8during an unemployment spell.8 Fourth, workers are homogeneous. Finally, we work in a
partial equilibrium setting focusing on the worker￿ s problem.
2.2 Agent￿ s Problem
We consider a single worker with ￿ ow utility U(c), where U0 > 0, U00 < 0 and discount rate






An unemployed worker receives unemployment bene￿ts b and samples wage o⁄ers from a
known distribution function, F(w), where f(w) = dF
dw. Wage o⁄ers arrive randomly at rate
￿(e;￿), where ￿1 ￿ 0, ￿11 ￿ 0, ￿12 ￿ 0 and ￿2 ￿ 0. Individuals exert costly search e⁄ort, e.
Following Andersen and Svarer (2009), we assume a linear, separable cost of search, denoted
by  (e). We characterize business cycles as shifts in labor demand via the parameter ￿,
which proxies for productivity.9 Workers who accept a wage o⁄er commence employment
immediately. When the worker is employed, she earns a wage w and pays taxes ￿ which
are used to ￿nance unemployment bene￿t payments. Consumption when employed is her
net wage, w ￿ ￿. Employment ends exogenously at separation rate s. Workers adopt a
reservation wage strategy accepting wage o⁄ers above the reservation wage, w, and choose
an optimal level of e⁄ort e. We refer the reader to section A.1 of the Appendix for a full
characterization of agent behavior in this model.
2.3 Elasticity Concepts
Let D denote expected duration. De￿ne the total elasticity of expected unemployment
duration with respect to the UI bene￿t level as " ￿
dlogD
dlogb . Section A.2 shows that we can
conveniently express the duration elasticity as:
" = "w + "e (2)
8We relax this assumption in Extension 1 in section A.6.1.
9In Extension 3 in section A.6.3, we consider business cycles driven by changes in F(w). We show that
our main theoretical results in proposition 2 are robust to whether variation in unemployment comes from
shifts in the job o⁄er arrival rate or shifts in the wage o⁄er distribution.
9The ￿rst term in (2), "w, is the duration elasticity in a reservation model with exogenous
job o⁄er arrivals (Shimer and Werning 2007). The second term in (2), "e, is the duration
elasticity in a search e⁄ort model with a ￿xed wage (Chetty 2008). Finally, we let u ￿
￿+s
￿+s+￿(e;￿)F(w); when ￿ ￿ 0, u is the steady-state unemployment rate.
2.4 Planner￿ s Problem ￿A Su¢ cient Statistics Approach
In this section, we consider the optimal unemployment insurance problem. Our approach is
to solve for the level of unemployment bene￿ts that maximize a utilitarian welfare function in
a given labor market state. We then focus on the question of how the welfare-maximizing UI
bene￿t level varies over the cycle. Let Vu(b;￿) denote the value function of an unemployed







The following proposition characterizes the money-metric marginal welfare gain of in-
creasing bene￿ts by $1.







U0(b) ￿ E[U0(w ￿ ￿)jw ￿ w]





U0(b) ￿ E[U0(w ￿ ￿)jw ￿ w]
E[U0(w ￿ ￿)jw ￿ w]
= " (4)
Proof. See section A.3 in the Appendix.
This is the standard ￿Baily-Chetty condition￿of optimal unemployment insurance (Baily
1978, Chetty 2006).10 It illustrates the standard trade-o⁄ between the insurance role of UI
10Shimer and Werning (2007) derive a di⁄erent representation for dW=db in terms of the responsiveness of
the after-tax reservation wage to UI bene￿ts. In section A.4, we formally establish the connection between
our expressions.
10bene￿ts against the disincentive e⁄ect. Moral hazard arises in the second-best world, since
agents do not internalize the planner￿ s balanced-budget constraint. Thus, they impose an
externality on the planner￿ s budget, captured by the elasticity of expected duration with
respect to UI bene￿ts, ".
To see how optimal UI varies over the cycle, we pursue a ￿su¢ cient statistics￿approach
by estimating directly how each side of (4) varies with the unemployment rate. We describe
in detail how we implement this in section 4. The advantage of this approach is that it is
less sensitive to the structure of the job search model, which as we now show, if not speci￿ed
correctly, can lead to potentially misleading conclusions about how optimal UI varies over
the cycle.
2.5 Duration Elasticity Over the Cycle ( d"
du)
In this section, we show that in a standard job search model the cyclicality of the unemploy-
ment duration elasticity is theoretically ambiguous. We illustrate this ambiguity by showing
that a model with a ￿xed wage and a search e⁄ort margin has a fundamentally di⁄erent
theoretical prediction than a model with a ￿xed arrival rate and stochastic wage o⁄ers. We
provide a purely intuition-based explanation of the main e⁄ects that cause these two models
to have di⁄erent predictions and refer the interested reader to proposition 2 in section A.5.1
of the Appendix for a more formal presentation and discussion of the results.
2.5.1 Comparative Statics in Reservation Wage Model (
d"w
du )
We begin by calibrating a job search model with a ￿xed arrival rate (￿(e;￿) = ￿) and
stochastic wage o⁄ers (w ￿ F(w)) in the spirit of Shimer and Werning (2007). Variation in
￿ generates variation in the unemployment rate, u, and this a⁄ects the duration elasticity,
"w. Figure 1 shows that the duration elasticity is increasing in the unemployment rate, u.
Intuitively, the agent￿ s value of unemployment is determined by the unemployment rate ￿
when the unemployment rate is high, the agent puts relatively more weight on unemployment
consumption utility. This is because she expects to be unemployed next period and so places
relatively more weight on utility in that state. Thus, an increase in UI bene￿ts raises the
11value of unemployment by more when the unemployment rate is high. Since the agent sets
the reservation wage so as to equate the value of employment with the value of unemployment,
this logic explains why the reservation wage (and, consequently, the duration elasticity) is
more responsive to UI bene￿ts when the unemployment rate is high.11
2.5.2 Comparative Statics in Search E⁄ort Model (d"e
du )
We next calibrate a job search model with a ￿xed wage (w) and an endogenous arrival rate
that depends on search e⁄ort (￿(e;￿)) in the spirit of Chetty (2008). As above, variation in
￿ generates variation in the unemployment rate, u, and this a⁄ects the duration elasticity,
"e. Figure 2 shows that the duration elasticity is decreasing in the unemployment rate, u.
In this model, there is a tension between two opposing economic forces in shaping how
search e⁄ort varies with UI bene￿ts over the cycle. First, there is the direct e⁄ect of a
recession on the marginal return to search e⁄ort. In a recession, individuals cannot a⁄ect
the job ￿nding probability by much, and therefore bene￿ts do not distort her search e⁄ort
very much, mitigating the moral hazard cost of bene￿ts in a downturn. In static models
(Andersen and Svarer (2009)), this e⁄ect fully determines how "e varies with u, so we label
this a ￿static e⁄ort e⁄ect￿ .
The opposing force is a ￿dynamic e⁄ort e⁄ect￿ .12 In a life-cycle model, a permanent
increase in bene￿ts raises the value of unemployment in all future periods. The agent￿ s be-
havioral response is pinned down by the present discounted value of this increase. A negative
and permanent labor demand shock lowers search e⁄ort, raising the probability of being un-
employed in future periods. This makes an increase in UI more valuable and exacerbates the
agent￿ s behavioral response in a downturn. Assuming su¢ cient complementarity between e
and ￿ in ￿(e;￿), the static e⁄ect will dominate the dynamic e⁄ect and "e will be procyclical,
as can be seen in Figure 2.13
11In terms of our taxonomy of e⁄ects, we label this a ￿discount e⁄ect￿ . In proposition 2 (equation 20) in
section A.5.1, we show that the sign of d"w=du can ￿ ip if the agent is su¢ ciently risk averse, and we label
this a ￿risk aversion e⁄ect￿ . In Figure 1, we assume CRRA preferences with a coe¢ cient of relative risk
aversion equal to 1:5, and at this value, the ￿discount e⁄ect;￿dominates the ￿risk aversion e⁄ect￿ .
12Corollaries 1 and 2 in section A.5.1 present expressions for @e=@b for a ￿xed wage, dynamic e⁄ort model
(equation 18) and a ￿xed wage, static e⁄ort model for comparison (equation 19).
13In a model with both stochastic wages and endogenous search e⁄ort, one also needs to additionally





E[U0(w￿￿)jw￿w] as the money-metric amount such that the government is indi⁄erent
between giving $1 to someone who is unemployed and g to someone who is employed. This
parameter captures the degree of consumption smoothing. In proposition 3 of the Appendix,
we show that the cyclicality of g depends on the relative strengths of (1) a budget e⁄ect
operating through the balanced-budget condition, (2) a reservation wage e⁄ect which comes
from the fact that the reservation wage varies over the business cycle, and (3) a liquidity
e⁄ect.14
Combining the duration elasticity and the consumption smoothing terms allow us to
solve for the optimal UI bene￿t level. Figures 1 and 2 plot the optimal UI bene￿t level
as a function of the unemployment rate for the two models above. As expected, whether
the optimal bene￿t level increases or decreases with the unemployment rate depends on the
precise speci￿cation and speci￿c parameters of the model. Our calibration results suggest
that, in contrast with some claims in the literature, the reservation wage model and the
￿xed-wage, endogenous search e⁄ort may have very di⁄erent implications when considering
how UI bene￿ts vary over the cycle. For example, Lentz and Traenes (2005) write that ￿We
do not believe that it is crucial whether the problem is formulated as a choice of reservation
wage given a ￿xed search intensity or (as here) as a choice of search intensity given a ￿xed
wage.￿ While there are many settings where this is true, our calibration results in this
section suggest that when studying the interaction between the UI bene￿t level that trades o⁄
consumption smoothing and moral hazard and the unemployment rate, this modeling choice
is not innocuous. This theoretical ambiguity motivates the su¢ cient statistics approach
pursued in this paper, which estimates how the duration elasticity and the consumption
smoothing bene￿t vary with the unemployment rate.
account for the e⁄ect of bene￿ts on reservation wages as shown in proposition 2 (equation 21) in section
A.5.1. We label this a ￿dynamic reservation wage e⁄ect￿ .
14In Extension 2 of section A.6.2, we show that if the planner can run de￿cits in bad times and surpluses
in good times and balance the budget across states, the budget e⁄ect disappears.
133 Empirical Analysis
The theoretical model above predicts that the unemployment duration elasticity (") and the
insurance e⁄ect (￿ g) vary with labor market conditions (￿), but the sign and magnitude of
these comparative statics are theoretically ambiguous. To take the model to the data, we
make three important assumptions.
First, we assume that the predetermined unemployment rate (u) at the start of an un-
employment spell is a valid proxy for ￿. Using the predetermined unemployment rate ￿
as opposed to the actual unemployment rate at a given time during an unemployment spell
￿alleviates the concern that the unemployment rate is endogenous to the UI bene￿t level.
Second, we assume that the unemployment rate is constant within an unemployment spell.
This assumption is motivated by the fact that virtually all of the variation in unemployment
rates is across-spell variation, with negligible within-spell variation.15 Lastly, we rely on
variation in unemployment rates between and within states, which implicitly assumes that
the relevant local labor market conditions are proxied by the state-level unemployment rate.16
We pursue this time-series, cross-sectional research design in order to have su¢ cient variation
in UI bene￿t levels across a wide range of labor market conditions.
3.1 Part 1: Duration Elasticity
The ￿rst part of the empirical analysis estimates how the duration elasticity varies with
the unemployment rate. We present two pieces of evidence: (1) graphical evidence and
nonparametric tests of survival curves and (2) semi-parametric estimates of proportional
hazard models (Cox models). The empirical strategy closely follows Chetty (2008).
We use unemployment spell data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation
(SIPP) spanning 1985-2000. We impose the same sample restrictions as in Chetty (2008):
we focus on prime-age males who (1) report searching for a job, (2) are not on temporary
15A variance decomposition of monthly local unemployment rates reveals that 98% of the variance is
between-spell and 2% is within-spell.
16In Table 5, we report results using the unemployment rate in the metropolitan area (MSA) instead, and
we ￿nd similar results.
14layo⁄, (3) have at least three months of work history, and (4) took up UI bene￿ts.17 We also
follow Chetty (2008) and censor unemployment spells at 50 weeks. Because of the di¢ culty
in constructing a precise measure of each individual￿ s actual bene￿t level, we follow Chetty
(2008) and use the average bene￿t level for each state-year pair and the (statutory) maximum
weekly bene￿t amount in the state-year in our baseline speci￿cations. The maximum weekly
bene￿t amount is the primary source of policy variation in bene￿t levels across states. We
also report results using alternative proxies: the average UI replacement rate and a simulated
UI bene￿t variable constructed for each state-year pair by using a UI bene￿t calculator to
calculate the average bene￿t level for a ￿xed national sample (Currie and Gruber 1996). All
proxies (and all nominal dollar values in the data) are adjusted to real dollars using the 2000
CPI-U series. The precise de￿nition and sources of all variables are described in section A.8
of the Appendix.
3.1.1 Graphical evidence and nonparametric tests
We begin by providing graphical evidence on the e⁄ect of unemployment bene￿ts on dura-
tions. We split the sample into two sub-samples according to whether individuals began
their unemployment spell in states with above-median unemployment rates or in states with
below-median unemployment rates, where each year we de￿ne the median unemployment rate
across states that year. We then assign monthly state unemployment rates to unemployment
spells based on the unemployment rate in the state that the individual resided in when his
spell began. Lastly, we categorize unemployment spells based on whether the prevailing UI
bene￿t level at the start of the spell in a given state and year is above or below the median
UI bene￿t level across the sample.
Figures 3 and 4 show the e⁄ect of UI bene￿ts on the probability of unemployment for
individuals in above-average and below-average unemployment state-years, respectively. In
each ￿gure, we plot Kaplan-Meier survival curves for individuals in low-bene￿t and high-
bene￿t states. The results in Figure 3 show that the curves are fairly similar in both
low-bene￿t and high-bene￿t states when the unemployment rate in a state-year is above the
17We thank Raj Chetty for assistance with the SIPP data.
15median unemployment rate. The curve in high-bene￿t states is slightly higher, indicating
that UI bene￿ts may marginally increase bene￿ts, but a nonparametric test that the curves
are identical does not reject at conventional levels (p = 0:599).18 By contrast, in Figure 4 the
curves are noticeably di⁄erent; in particular, durations are signi￿cantly longer in high-bene￿t
states, and the di⁄erence between the survival curves is strongly statistically signi￿cant (p =
0:004).19
These ￿gures suggest that the moral hazard cost of UI bene￿ts depends crucially on
whether unemployment is high or low. In particular, our ￿ndings suggest that the e⁄ect of
UI bene￿ts on durations is not statistically signi￿cant when the unemployment rate is high
but is strongly statistically signi￿cant when the unemployment rate is low.20 These e⁄ects are
based on simple comparisons across spells. It is possible, however, that the characteristics
of individuals vary with unemployment rate in a way that would bias these e⁄ects. To
investigate this issue and other potential biases, as well as to quantify the magnitude of this
interaction e⁄ect, the next subsection reports results from the estimation of semi-parametric
proportional hazard models that include a rich set of individual-level controls. Overall, we
￿nd that the results from the hazard models are broadly consistent with the results based on
these ￿gures.
3.1.2 Semiparametric Hazard Models
We investigate the robustness of the graphical results by estimating a set of Cox proportional
hazard models. All results reported standard errors clustered by state. The baseline
18Across all the ￿gures, we report p-values of log-rank tests of equality across the two survival curves. This
is the appropriate test to use when data are censored (as is the case in our data). Results using Wilcoxon
rank sum test, as are reported in Chetty (2008), are generally very similar.
19While the survival curves are statistically signi￿cantly di⁄erent in Figure 4 but not in Figure 3, one
might ask whether the di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence (DD) across the two ￿gures is statistically signi￿cant. To
answer this question, we construct a semiparametric test by estimating a Cox proportional hazard model
with separate nonparametric baseline hazard estimates for above-median and below-median unemployment
state-years. We include two covariates in this Cox model, an indicator for above-median bene￿ts and a DD
term which is 1 for above-median bene￿ts in above-median unemployment state-years and 0 otherwise. The
p-value on the estimated DD coe¢ cient is 0:050.
20We have also looked at the subsample of workers with above-median liquid wealth, and we ￿nd broadly
similar results (see Appendix Figures A2 and A3). These results suggest that liquidity e⁄ects are not
primarily accounting for the di⁄erential duration elasticity between high and low unemployment, which is
broadly consistent with our results in Table 9, described below.
16estimating equation is the following:21
loghi;s;t = ￿t + ￿s + ￿1 log(bs;t) + ￿2(log(bs;t) ￿ us;t0) + ￿3us;t0 + Xi;s;t￿ + ei;s;t (5)
where hi;s;t is the hazard rate of exit out of unemployment for individual i in state s at time t,
￿t and ￿s represent year and state ￿xed e⁄ects, bs;t is the unemployment bene￿t for individual
i at the start of the spell based on the state the individual resided in at the start of the spell,
and Xi;s;t is a set of (possibly time-varying) control variables. Our primary proxy for local
labor market conditions, us;t0, is the log state unemployment rate at the start of the spell
relative to the log national unemployment rate. We assign the monthly state unemployment
rate based on the month at the start of the spell and the individual￿ s state of residence. For
example, if an individual in New York became unemployed in July 2000 and his spell lasted
until October 2000, we use the New York unemployment rate in July 2000. The decision
to use log unemployment rates follows Bertrand (2004), and we ￿nd similar results with the
unemployment rate in levels as shown below. We discuss the decision to use relative rather
than absolute unemployment rates in detail in section 3.1.3 below. All variables are de-
meaned so that ￿￿1 represents the elasticity of unemployment durations with respect to the
UI bene￿t level at the average state unemployment rate.22 The coe¢ cient on the interaction
term (￿￿2) is the incremental change in the duration elasticity for a one log point change in
the state unemployment rate, holding the national unemployment rate constant.
The identifying assumption that allows us to interpret ￿2 as a test of whether the duration
elasticity varies with the unemployment rate is the following: conditional on the UI weekly
bene￿t amount, state unemployment rate, state ￿xed e⁄ects, year ￿xed e⁄ects, and control
variables, there are no omitted determinants of the duration of an unemployment spell that
vary with the interaction of the UI weekly bene￿t amount and the state unemployment
21The notation of the estimating equation is a simpli￿ed presentation of the true model. The (latent)
hazard rate is not actually observed in the data, and there is a ￿ exible (nonparametric) baseline hazard rate
which is also estimated when ￿tting the Cox proportional hazard model. Also, following Chetty (2008), we
￿t a separate baseline hazard rate for each quartile of net liquid wealth, although our results are very similar
when a single nonparametric baseline hazard rate is estimated instead (see Appendix Table A1).
22We will use this approximation throughout for the expected unemployment duration log(D) ￿ log(1=h) =
￿log(h), so that the duration elasticity and other marginal e⁄ects of interest are given by the negative of the
coe¢ cient in the hazard model.
17rate. This assumption is considerably more plausible with the inclusion of state and year
￿xed e⁄ects, though there remains the concern that bene￿ts respond endogenously to both
observed and unobserved local labor market conditions. In section 3.1.3, we discuss this
(and many other) threats to validity in more detail.
Before turning to our regression results, we present descriptive statistics for our SIPP sam-
ple in Panel A of Table 1. The table presents summary statistics for the overall sample and
the two sub-samples used to create Figures 3 and 4. The two sub-samples are broadly similar,
though unemployed individuals are slightly older in states with high unemployment.23
The main results are reported in Table 2. Following Chetty (2008), the baseline speci￿ca-
tion controls for age, marital status, years of education, a full set of state, year, industry and
occupation ￿xed e⁄ects, and a 10-knot linear spline in log annual wage income.24 Column
(1) reports estimates of equation (5). The key coe¢ cient of interest is the interaction term
between the UI bene￿t level and the log state unemployment rate. The results indicate that
the elasticity of unemployment durations with respect to the UI bene￿t level (￿￿2) is 0:563
(s.e. 0:300) at the average unemployment rate. The (average) duration elasticity estimate is
broadly similar to the previous literature (Mo¢ tt (1985), Meyer (1990), Chetty (2008)). The
results in column (1) show an estimate of ￿￿2 of ￿1:262 (s.e. 0:434). The bottom two rows
of Table 2 report the duration elasticity when the state unemployment rate is one standard
deviation (1:3 percentage points) above and below the mean unemployment rate (6:2%). At
one standard deviation above the mean, the duration elasticity is 0:304 (s.e. 0:300), while
at one standard deviation below the mean the duration elasticity is 0:822 (s.e. 0:325). In
column (2), the average UI bene￿t level is replaced by the statutory maximum UI bene￿t
level in the state-year, and the results are very similar. In the robustness tests that follow,
we will present results which use both the average and the maximum UI bene￿t level.
23In Table 6 below, we control for compositional changes in the sample of unemployed individuals across
labor market conditions, and we ￿nd extremely similar results. We also investigate more systematically how
the composition of unemployed workers varies with the unemployment rate in Appendix Table A3.
24The only change to the baseline empirical speci￿cation in Chetty (2008) that we make is that we do not
include the interaction of log(Average UI WBA) with unemployment duration (i.e., number of weeks elapsed
in current spell). This control is intended to capture duration dependence in the response to UI bene￿ts, but
because it is di¢ cult to interpret this coe¢ cient and it is always statistically and economically insigni￿cant,
we do not include it in any speci￿cations. All results with this interaction term included are extremely
similar.
18These results imply that the magnitude of the duration elasticity decreases with the
unemployment rate and suggest that the moral hazard cost of unemployment insurance is
lower when the unemployment rate is relatively high. This empirical ￿nding is consistent
with a parameterization of our model where search e⁄ort (e) and labor demand conditions
(￿) are strongly complementary, as in the simulation reported in Figure 2.
3.1.3 What If UI Bene￿ts Respond to Labor Market Conditions?
An immediate concern with our identi￿cation strategy is that UI bene￿ts may be correlated
with unobserved labor market conditions. We pursue several strategies to address this
concern. While the sign of the bias due to the endogeneity of UI bene￿ts is not clear a
priori, the collection of evidence in this section suggests that our baseline result is likely
a conservative estimate (i.e., lower bound) of how the duration elasticity varies with the
unemployment rate.
Table 3 reports OLS estimates from several regressions of the log of the maximum UI
bene￿t level on the log of the state unemployment rate relative to the national unemployment
rate. The results in this table provide no economically or statistically signi￿cant evidence
that bene￿ts respond to local labor market conditions. We view this as evidence that UI
bene￿ts are plausibly exogenous conditional on state and year ￿xed e⁄ects. Nevertheless,
the point estimates in this table suggest that UI bene￿ts may be more responsive to the
unemployment rate in bad times than in good times. This type of policy endogeneity would
bias estimates of ￿1 and ￿2 in equation (5), and motivates our analysis to assess the possible
bias from such policy endogeneity through several alternative speci￿cations.
In Table 4, we report results which control ￿ exibly for the local unemployment rate and
control for unobserved trends.25 Column (1) reports our baseline speci￿cation for compari-
son. Columns (2) through (4) include various polynomial functions of the local unemploy-
ment rate and the UI bene￿t level. These tests address the concern that UI bene￿ts respond
non-linearly to the local unemployment rate. Additionally, to the extent that the ￿ exible
polynomial in the unemployment rate more thoroughly controls for unobserved local labor
25All of the results in Table 4 are replicated in Appendix Table A1 using the maximum UI bene￿t level
instead of the average UI bene￿t level, and the results are very similar.
19market conditions, this speci￿cation can be used to gauge the extent of the bias due to policy
endogeneity. Though the results are somewhat less precise, the results in these columns sug-
gest that, if anything, the magnitude of our interaction term is larger with these more ￿ exible
controls.26 Columns (5) through (7) include speci￿cations which include some combination
of interactions between the state unemployment rate and state ￿xed e⁄ects and interactions
between the state unemployment rate and year ￿xed e⁄ects. These speci￿cations capture the
possibility that in certain states and/or certain years, UI bene￿ts may be unusually responsive
to changes in local labor market conditions. Again, the results suggest that, if anything, the
magnitude of our interaction term is larger with these more ￿ exible controls. Lastly, columns
(8) through (10) report results from modi￿cations of our baseline speci￿cation which focus
on alternative assumptions regarding contemporaneous trends across states within a region
and within states over time. To the extent that such smoothly-varying unobserved trends
are correlated with the interaction of local labor market conditions and UI bene￿t levels, this
would cause our baseline speci￿cation to be biased. The results in columns (8) through (10)
show that results are very similar when we ￿ exibly control for unobserved trends.
Our second strategy formally explores the possibility of unobserved factors determining
both UI bene￿ts and unemployment durations. As our empirical strategy is essentially
equivalent to estimating a di⁄erence-in-di⁄erences regression, we consider the case where the
unemployment rate us;t can only take two values: uH and uL, with uH > uL.27 In this case,
estimating equation (5) is equivalent to estimating the following two equations:
log(Di;H;t) = ￿H log(bs;t) + vH + ￿t + ￿s + ei;H;t if us;t = uH (6)
log(Di;L;t) = ￿L log(bs;t) + vL + ￿t + ￿s + ei;L;t if us;t = uL (7)
The coe¢ cient ￿2 on the interaction term log(bs;t) ￿ us;t in equation (5) is given by the
di⁄erence between ￿H and ￿L. Each of these two equations is subject to a standard identi-
26We have also investigated robustness to ￿ exible, non-linear e⁄ects of UI bene￿t level in addition to
the local unemployment rate. These results are in Appendix Table A2, where we re-estimate our baseline
speci￿cation with various non-linear (polynomial) functions of the unemployment rate and the UI bene￿t
level. The results are similar to our baseline speci￿cation.
27This discussion extends Bertrand (2004).
20￿cation problem: each equation is a reduced form equation from a system of two equations,
an equation determining durations and an equation determining UI bene￿ts. Consider the
following simpli￿ed two-equation system:




where q = fH;Lg. The ￿rst equation describes the duration equation and the second
equation describes the UI bene￿t equation. The variable ￿
q represents unobserved labor
demand shocks which a⁄ect both UI bene￿ts and unemployment durations, and ￿q represents
unobserved factors which shift UI bene￿ts and are orthogonal to local labor market conditions.
We can now ask what happens if one estimates (6) and (7) ignoring the endogeneity of
bene￿ts? It is straightforward to show that the estimated coe¢ cient b ￿q is given by the
following:
b ￿q = ￿q + ￿q
This illustrates the well-known identi￿cation problem that b ￿q 6= ￿q when ￿q 6= 0. Under
the assumption that ￿q = 0, it is easy to see that ￿H and ￿L (and therefore ￿H ￿￿L) can be
consistently estimated. This assumption requires that all variation in bene￿ts be driven by
shocks that are uncorrelated with unobserved labor demand shocks. By contrast, if ￿q 6= 0,
we need stronger assumptions for identi￿cation. Under the strong assumption that ￿H = ￿L,
then b ￿H ￿b ￿L = ￿H ￿￿L. Thus, while we cannot identify the main e⁄ect when ￿H = ￿L 6= 0,
we will be able to consistently estimate the interaction term of interest.
A key remaining challenge arises when ￿q depends on q. For ease of exposition, consider
the case where bene￿ts are exogenous in good times, but are endogenous to local labor demand
conditions in bad times (e.g., ￿L = 0 and ￿H > 0). In this case, b ￿H ￿ b ￿L = ￿H ￿ ￿L + ￿H.
This illustrates that this particular type of policy endogeneity works against the ￿ndings in
our baseline speci￿cation. Intuitively, if variation in bene￿ts is plausibly exogenous during
good times, then we will consistently estimate the duration elasticity in good times; however,
if variation in bene￿ts is correlated with unobserved labor market conditions during bad
21times, then this will cause upward bias in the magnitude of the duration elasticity during
bad times (e.g., b ￿H = ￿H + ￿H > ￿H). Since we ￿nd that the magnitude of the duration
elasticity is signi￿cantly smaller during bad times, we conclude that policy endogeneity likely
causes us to understate the magnitude of the interaction term.
As a ￿nal test of policy endogeneity, Table 5 reports results which use metropolitan areas
(MSAs) rather than states to de￿ne local labor markets.28 By using the MSA unemploy-
ment rate instead of the state unemployment rate, we can exploit within-state, across-MSA
variation in local labor market conditions, holding UI bene￿t levels ￿xed. Columns (1)
through (3) report results using the average UI bene￿t level, while columns (4) through (6)
report analogous results using the maximum UI bene￿t level. Overall, the results across
both panels are fairly similar to the baseline speci￿cation. In columns (3) and (6), we report
results which include a full set of state-by-year ￿xed e⁄ects, so that the only variation used
to estimate the interaction term is within-state-year, across-MSA variation in the unemploy-
ment rate, holding the state-year UI bene￿t level constant. The interaction term remains
economically and statistically signi￿cant at conventional levels in both panels (p = 0:038 and
p = 0:058), and the magnitude of the estimates are somewhat larger than in the baseline
speci￿cation. These results suggest that policy endogeneity is unlikely to account for our
results. We note that the results in this table also alleviate the concern that our estimates
are confounding state UI potential duration e⁄ects with state UI bene￿t e⁄ects, as state-year
￿xed e⁄ects capture all of the variation in the maximum potential duration of UI bene￿ts.
The last threat to identi￿cation we discuss comes from the implicit assumption that UI
bene￿ts respond symmetrically to both local and national labor market shocks.29 If bene￿ts
respond to observable and unobservable national labor market conditions, then including year
￿xed e⁄ects, as we do in our baseline speci￿cation, addresses the problem. The concern is
that when the national labor market is bad, bene￿ts are more correlated with labor market
conditions than when national labor market is good. In this case, year ￿xed e⁄ects will
28To preserve the sample size, we assign the state unemployment rate to all unemployed individuals who
do not have an MSA code, which is roughly 50% of the sample.
29A local unemployment shock may di⁄er from a national unemployment shock since it changes mobility
incentives. Current U.S. law mandates that individuals collect UI bene￿ts in the state of their previous
employer. Given this restriction, we believe the mobility response to UI bene￿ts is likely to be low.
22not capture the fact that the correlation between bene￿ts and unobservable labor market
conditions depends on the year. One strategy for dealing with this is interacting year ￿xed
e⁄ects with UI bene￿ts and including this as a control. This means that any variation in
bene￿ts that is correlated with the (unobservables in the) year ￿xed e⁄ects is not variation
we use to identify the interaction term. Alternatively, one may use relative unemployment
rates to address the concern. In regression results not reported, we ￿nd that UI bene￿ts
are larger when national unemployment rate is high. We also ￿nd results that suggest when
the national unemployment rate is high, state bene￿ts are more responsive to relative state
unemployment rates. Motivated by this concern, we use the state unemployment rate relative
to the national unemployment rate in all speci￿cations.30
Overall, given the results in Tables 2 through 5, we interpret our preferred estimate as
a conservative estimate of the magnitude of the relationship between the duration elasticity
and the local unemployment rate. We ￿nd no evidence that a simple policy endogeneity
story is primarily responsible for our ￿ndings. The next section explores additional threats
to validity and alternative explanations for our ￿ndings.
3.1.4 Alternative Explanations and Robustness Tests
Composition Bias and Endogenous Take-up
As the local unemployment rate ￿ uctuates, there may be compositional changes in the
pool of unemployed workers receiving UI bene￿ts. For example, if there is heterogeneity
in moral hazard across demographic groups, and the distribution of demographics of the
unemployed varies with the level of unemployment, then this compositional change could
generate an observed change in the average duration elasticity. We ￿rst note that the
appropriate measure for the welfare calibrations below is how the average duration elasticity
varies with the unemployment rate, and that this is true whether or not the change in
the average duration elasticity is primarily due to compositional changes or individual-level
changes in moral hazard. Nevertheless, we investigate the extent to which compositional
30We ￿nd similar results if we include year ￿xed e⁄ects interacted with UI bene￿ts as a control, and we
also ￿nd similar results when we include the national unemployment rate interacted with UI bene￿ts as a
control.
23changes can account for our ￿ndings, as understanding this may be important for other
economic problems.
In Table 6 we report estimates of an augmented version of our baseline speci￿cation
where we add interactions between UI bene￿ts and the following demographic variables: age,
marital status, education, pre-unemployment wage, occupation ￿xed e⁄ects, industry ￿xed
e⁄ects.31 If the estimate of the baseline interaction term is primarily due to compositional
changes among demographic groups with di⁄erent duration elasticities, then we would expect
to see a reduction in the magnitude of the coe¢ cient as we include additional interactions
between UI bene￿ts and demographic controls. The results in Table 6 show that our main
result is very robust to including such controls ￿looking across all the columns, we see that
adding interactions between demographics and UI bene￿ts has a negligible e⁄ect on our main
coe¢ cient of interest.32
The ￿nal column investigates a related source of compositional bias, which is selection bias
due to endogenous take-up. As shown in column (9), we ￿nd that the e⁄ect of UI bene￿ts
on take-up varies with the unemployment rate. We also ￿nd that the unemployment rate
itself is a strong predictor of take-up. These results raise concerns about possible selection
bias, though the results in the rest of the columns in Table 6 suggest negligible e⁄ects of
selection on observables.33 While the duration elasticity could also vary with unobservable
characteristics of individuals, the robustness to selection on observables suggests that it is
unlikely that our interaction term is primarily due to selection on unobservables, though of
course we cannot test this directly.
Alternative Measures of the Interaction Term
31These tests are motivated by recent work which ￿nds evidence that the composition of unemployed
workers varies over the business cycle (Mueller 2010). In Appendix Table A3 we investigate how the
composition of workers is associated with the unemployment rate. We do not ￿nd signi￿cant evidence
that the composition of unemployed workers varies with the unemployment rate. In Appendix Table A4, we
show that results are very similar to Table 6 when using maximum UI WBA instead of average UI WBA.
32The results in this table also reveal suggestive evidence that the duration elasticity varies with years
of education. Though accounting for this interaction has no e⁄ect on our interaction term of interest, it
nevertheless suggests that moral hazard cost may vary with the observable level of human capital.
33In results not reported, we ￿nd very similar results if we estimate the following two-step estimator. In
the ￿rst step, we estimate a probit model of UI receipt on interaction term using the same set of controls
used in the baseline proportional hazard model using the expanded sample which includes eligibles who do
not receive UI bene￿ts. In the second step, we estimate the baseline hazard speci￿cation including as an
additional control the inverse Mills ratio evaluated at the ￿tted values.
24In our baseline speci￿cation, the interaction term of interest is formed by interacting the
log of the average weekly UI bene￿t or the maximum weekly bene￿t amount in the state with
the log of the state unemployment rate (relative to the log of the national unemployment rate).
Table 7 explores several alternative measures of the interaction term by using alternative
proxies for UI bene￿ts and alternative proxies for local labor demand conditions. Each row of
Table 7 reports results from estimating our baseline speci￿cation with an alternative measure
of our interaction term. The ￿rst row reproduces our baseline estimates for comparison. The
second row replaces the state unemployment rate with a dummy variable for whether or not
the unemployment rate is greater than the median state unemployment rate in that year.
This speci￿cation corresponds more closely to the nonparametric results presented above.
The third row reports results using the state unemployment rate in levels (rather than logs).
In both cases, the results are similar to the baseline speci￿cation. The fourth row shows
that results are similar using the average replacement rate rather than the average weekly UI
bene￿t amount. The ￿fth row reports reduced form results using a ￿simulated instrumental
variable￿ following Currie and Gruber (1996). By construction, the variation in this UI
bene￿t variable is only due to changes in program parameters, holding sample composition
constant.34 Reassuringly, we ￿nd similar results to our baseline speci￿cation.35 The sixth
row uses an alternative proxy for local labor demand instead of the local unemployment
rate. One concern with the unemployment rate is that it re￿ ects both labor demand and
labor supply shocks. We construct variation in state unemployment rates that is driven by
plausibly exogenous shifts in local labor demand using a well-established procedure developed
in Bartik (1991).36 Appendix Figures A4 and A5 plot survival curves comparing the e⁄ect
of UI bene￿ts across high and low predicted employment-to-population ratios. Consistent
with Figures 3 and 4, this nonparametric evidence indicates that the behavioral e⁄ect of UI
bene￿ts is largest during periods of high predicted employment. Row 6 of Table 7 reports
34This variable is constructed by using a ￿xed 20% 1993 (national) sample and computing the average
weekly UI bene￿t in this ￿xed sample for every state-year combination in the data set.
35Appendix Table A2 reports similar results when this simulated instrument is used as an instrumental
variable for the average UI WBA. This is implemented using a two-step control function approach.
36We closely following the implementation of the Bartik (1991) procedure in Autor and Duggan (2003).
We predict the employment to population ratio by interacting initial cross-sectional distribution of state-level
employment shares with national industry employment trends. See the Data Appendix for more details.
25hazard model estimates, where the magnitude of the interaction term is similar to our baseline
speci￿cations, but our estimates are imprecise.
Decomposing Variation in the State Unemployment Rate
In our baseline speci￿cation, identi￿cation of the interaction term of interest comes from
both across-state and within-state variation in unemployment rates. Appendix Figures A6
and A7 report survival curves analogous to Figures 3 and 4 using only within-state variation
in unemployment rates. We do this by subtracting the unemployment rate in each state-year
by the average unemployment rate in the state over the sample period. These ￿gures show
that the same pattern in Figures 3 and 4 emerges when using only within-state variation in
the unemployment rate. These ￿gures show that there is a statistically signi￿cant di⁄erence
between the high- and low-bene￿t survival curves when the unemployment rate is relatively
low, but not when it is relatively high. Appendix Figures A8 and A9 show similar results
using only cross-state variation in the state unemployment. To construct these ￿gures, we
compute the average state unemployment rate over the sample period and divide the states
based on whether they are above or below the median.
We quantify these patterns in row 7 of Table 7, where we report results from a speci￿cation
where we decompose the variation in the state unemployment rate into across-state variation
and within-state variation. This speci￿cation allows us to see separately how across-state
and within-state variation in the state unemployment rate a⁄ects the duration elasticity.
We ￿nd that both interaction terms are the same sign and roughly similar magnitude as
the interaction term in the baseline speci￿cation. Most importantly, the magnitude of the
interaction term using purely within-state variation is very similar to the baseline results.37
Finally, Appendix Table A2 reports results using alternative sets of control variables,
including controlling for the maximum potential duration of UI bene￿ts, as well as alterna-
tive speci￿cations allowing for nonlinear direct e⁄ects and speci￿cations which decompose
the source of variation in state unemployment rates. The results are similar across these
37It may be that a national shock is more persistent than a local shock. If we associate the between-
state variation in unemployment rates with a measure of permanent shocks and the within-state variation
with a measure of temporary shocks, we ￿nd that with available statistical precision, we cannot reject the
hypothesis that the correlation between the duration elasticity and the unemployment rate is the same across
both sources of variation.
26alternative samples and speci￿cations.
To summarize, across all the speci￿cations in this section, we ￿nd no evidence that our
baseline results are primarily due to compositional changes, sample selection, mismeasure-
ment, or other spurious factors. We therefore conclude that the most likely explanation for
our ￿ndings is that the disincentive e⁄ect of UI bene￿ts decreases with the unemployment
rate.
3.1.5 Comparison to Schmieder et al. (2011) and Landais et al. (2011)
While we focus on how the welfare-maximizing UI bene￿t level varies over the cycle, recent
work by Schmieder et al. (2011) considers how the welfare-maximizing potential duration
of UI bene￿ts varies over the business cycle. They consider a ￿xed wage, search e⁄ort
model and derive a formula for the marginal welfare gain of extending the maximum length
of time an individual is eligible to receive UI bene￿ts. Similar to our work, they pursue
a su¢ cient statistics approach and empirically estimate how several of the inputs to their
formula vary over the cycle. Speci￿cally, they implement a regression discontinuity design
using administrative data from Germany to identify the elasticity of non-employment and
actual bene￿t duration with respect to the potential bene￿t duration. This research design
allows them to very credibly estimate an elasticity for each year in their sample (1987-2004).
They show that their annual estimate of the non-employment duration elasticity does not
correlate signi￿cantly with the annual unemployment rate over this time period. On the
other hand, the actual bene￿t duration elasticity is signi￿cantly positively correlated with
the unemployment rate. These empirical ￿ndings suggest that the welfare gain of an increase
UI bene￿t generosity (in this case, through UI bene￿t extensions) is higher during recessions.
There are several di⁄erences between the studies to highlight: institutional setting (United
States versus Germany), research design (￿xed e⁄ects panel versus regression discontinuity),
de￿nition of the labor market (local versus national), UI bene￿t variation (bene￿t level versus
potential duration). Additionally, the marginal worker a⁄ected by the UI variation in their
setting is an experienced worker older than age 40, while the UI variation in our setting
a⁄ects a majority of the workers eligible for UI. All of these di⁄erences make the empirical
27estimates not strictly comparable.
The recent work of Landais et al. (2011) also suggests an economic explanation for the
di⁄erences in results. While we study changes in UI bene￿t levels which a⁄ect a major-
ity of unemployed workers, Schmieder et al. study changes in UI bene￿t generosity across
age thresholds, holding program parameters constant. Therefore, one may interpret the
Schmieder et al. estimates as partial equilibrium (PE) estimates and our estimates as gen-
eral equilibrium (GE) estimates. The logic is that since they analyze the e⁄ect of UI by
comparing across two groups experiencing the same labor market conditions, it is possible
that some of the GE e⁄ects of UI are ￿di⁄erenced out￿ . By contrast, our estimation strategy
primarily relies on comparing observably similar individuals receiving the same bene￿ts in
di⁄erent labor markets. Under this interpretation, the combined evidence across the two
papers suggests that the PE duration elasticity does not vary over the cycle while the GE
duration elasticity is strongly decreasing in the unemployment rate. This is precisely the
predictions of the job rationing model in Landais et al. (2011), providing a parsimonious ex-
planation for the empirical ￿ndings in the two papers. One problem with this interpretation
is that the PE estimates in Schmieder et al. are lower than the estimates in this paper, while
the Landais et al. paper predicts a larger PE elasticity than GE elasticity. We speculate that
this di⁄erence may simply be due to di⁄erent behavioral responses to UI bene￿t levels versus
UI bene￿t extensions, although we leave a rigorous investigation of this to future work.
3.2 Part 2: Consumption Smoothing
The second part of our empirical analysis replicates and extends previous work on the con-
sumption smoothing bene￿t of UI (Gruber 1997). Speci￿cally, we estimate how the e⁄ect of
UI on the consumption drop upon unemployment varies with the state unemployment rate
in the previous year. The empirical strategy closely follows Gruber (1997), which uses the
after-tax UI replacement rate rather than the UI bene￿t level and uses the change in total
food consumption as a proxy for the change in total consumption.
We use data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) between 1968 and 1987.
We impose the same sample restrictions as in Gruber (1997): we focus on all heads of house-
28hold who are employed at interview date t ￿ 1 and unemployed at date t, and we de￿ne
individuals as unemployed if they are looking for a new job and are not on temporary layo⁄;
furthermore, observations are excluded if any element of food consumption is imputed or
there is more than a threefold change in total food consumption. We present descriptive
statistics for our PSID sample in Panel B of Table 1.
The baseline speci￿cation is the following:
￿logCi;t = ￿t + ￿s + ￿1bi;s;t + ￿2(bi;s;t ￿ us;t￿1) + ￿3us;t￿1 + Xi;s;t￿ + ei;s;t (8)
where ￿logCi;t is the di⁄erence in log total food consumption for individual i between year
t￿1 and year t, bi;s;t is the after-tax UI replacement rate, us;t￿1 is the log state unemployment
rate relative to the national unemployment rate in year t ￿ 1, ￿t and ￿s are year and state
￿xed e⁄ects, and Xi;s;t is the same set of control variables used in Gruber (1997). We de-
mean the unemployment rate measure so that ￿1 gives the consumption smoothing bene￿t
at average levels of unemployment.38
Table 8 reports results of estimating equation (8). Column (1) reproduces column (4) in
Table 1 of Gruber (1997) and column (2) reports our replication e⁄ort. Column (2) shows
the average consumption smoothing bene￿t of UI (￿1) using our replication sample. We ￿nd
that a ten percentage point increase in the UI replacement rate reduces the consumption
drop upon unemployment by 2:6% (s.e. 1:2%).39 Column (3) reports our preferred speci￿-
cation which includes the interaction between the replacement rate and the unemployment
rate. The estimate on the coe¢ cient of our interaction term is economically and statistically
insigni￿cant (￿2 = 0:004, s.e. 0:213). The remaining columns of Table 8 report a variety of
alternative of speci￿cations of equation (8), and none of the results in these columns provide
any evidence that the consumption smoothing bene￿t of UI varies with the state unemploy-
38As in the ￿rst part of the empirical analysis, in our preferred speci￿cation we use the log di⁄erence
between the state unemployment rate and the national unemployment rate. Also, we use the previous year￿ s
unemployment rate because we do not observe individuals at the start of their spell, and we want to ensure
that the unemployment rate is predetermined, for reasons discussed above.
39The coe¢ cient estimates from our replication sample match the results in Gruber (1997) fairly closely.
We have been unable to account for the remaining di⁄erences. We are grateful to Jonathan Gruber for
sharing his UI bene￿t calculator, which greatly improved our original replication e⁄ort.
29ment rate. As with the duration elasticity analysis above, the ￿nal two rows report estimates
at one standard deviation above and below the mean unemployment rate. Unlike the dura-
tion elasticity results (which showed that the duration elasticity was signi￿cantly lower when
the unemployment rate was relatively high), the ￿nal two rows in Table 8 consistently show
that the consumption smoothing bene￿t of UI does not vary with the unemployment rate.40
In addition to the results based on consumption data, we modify the duration elasticity
speci￿cations from above to study the consumption smoothing e⁄ect of UI. Chetty (2008)
presents evidence that a component of the observed duration elasticity represents an income
e⁄ect (or ￿liquidity e⁄ect￿ ). This implies greater welfare gains to UI than would be the case if
the duration elasticity represented a pure substitution e⁄ect, and suggests that the interaction
term which we estimate in our baseline speci￿cation in the ￿rst part of our empirical analysis
could plausibly represent a liquidity e⁄ect which varies systematically with local labor market
conditions. In principle, the consumption smoothing results rule out this possibility as
they incorporate liquidity e⁄ects. Nevertheless, we present these additional results as a
complementary consumption smoothing test (speci￿cally, whether our interaction term in
the duration elasticity speci￿cation is plausibly driven by liquidity e⁄ects). An important
caveat to these duration-based results is that ￿as in Chetty (2008) ￿these speci￿cations
do not exploit plausibly exogenous variation in liquidity constraints, but rather compare
duration elasticities across individuals who di⁄er in net liquid wealth.
Table 9 reports these alternative speci￿cations which investigate whether liquidity e⁄ects
a⁄ect the interaction term. Column (1) reports our baseline speci￿cation for comparison.
Column (2) reports results for the subsample of workers in the 3rd and 4th quartiles of net
liquid wealth, where liquidity e⁄ects are likely to be less important. The coe¢ cient on the
interaction is slightly larger than in the baseline speci￿cation.41 Columns (3) and (4) report
results which include a full set of liquid wealth quartile dummy variables interacted with a
combination of occupation ￿xed e⁄ects, industry ￿xed e⁄ects, unemployment duration, and
40We have also tested whether the consumption level varies with the unemployment rate, and we have
found no statistically or economically signi￿cant evidence of such an interaction e⁄ect.
41The interaction term when using the subsample of unemployed workers without a mortgage (another
proxy for individuals that are not liquidity constrained used in Chetty (2008)) is even larger in magnitude
than columns (1) and (2), again providing no evidence that liquidity e⁄ects are primarily responsible for the
interaction term in our baseline speci￿cation.
30the UI bene￿t level, and the results are, if anything, slightly stronger. Lastly, column (5)
veri￿es that the interaction term does not vary with liquid wealth. The results consistently
support the interpretation that the moral hazard cost of UI decreases with the unemployment
rate, and that our results are not primarily due to liquidity e⁄ects varying with local labor
market conditions. More broadly, the results in this table do not provide any evidence that
the consumption smoothing bene￿t (or insurance value) of UI varies with the unemployment
rate, which is consistent with the consumption-based tests above.
Overall, we conclude that the consumption smoothing bene￿t of UI is approximately
constant across labor market states. We next conduct a welfare analysis using our empirical
results from the two parts of our empirical analysis.
4 Calibrating the Welfare Implications
Our empirical results suggest that moral hazard decreases with the unemployment rate. To
see what this ￿nding implies for optimal policy, we now calibrate the UI bene￿t level that
trades o⁄the consumption smoothing bene￿t and the moral hazard cost, following the spirit
of the ￿su¢ cient statistic￿approach to welfare analysis. To review, this method requires
using the reduced form empirical estimates as inputs into the optimal UI formula.
One can think of " = h(log(u)), where h() is a non-linear function. In order to exploit
our empirical estimates, we assume that h() can be locally approximated by a linear function




= ￿￿1 ￿ ￿2 ￿ (log(u) ￿ log(u))
where ￿￿1 = "(log(u)) and ￿￿2 = d"=dlog(u). Our empirical results imply that ￿b ￿1 =
0:563 and ￿b ￿2 = ￿1:262.42
To analyze the welfare implications, recall that the optimal UI bene￿t level equates the
42The optimal UI formula in this section delivers the optimal UI replacement rate, which implies that the
relevant duration elasticity is the elasticity of unemployment durations with respect to the UI replacement
rate, rather than the UI bene￿t level. For simplicity, we use the results from the baseline speci￿cation using
the level of bene￿ts, since the duration elasticity results using replacement rate are similar (see row (4) of
Table 7).
31consumption smoothing bene￿t with the moral hazard cost of UI as follows:
U0(b) ￿ E[U0(w ￿ ￿)jw ￿ w]
E[U0(w ￿ ￿)jw ￿ w]
= "


















where ￿ is the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion, ￿c
c (b) is the consumption drop at unem-




is a correction factor that accounts for the volatility in consumption when employed.43 It is
de￿ned in terms of se, the coe¢ cient of variation of consumption when employed. For ease
of computation, we assume a ￿xed wage, search e⁄ort model, so that F = 1, and we calibrate
the consumption smoothing bene￿t using the estimate for the consumption drop based on
our reduced form empirical results.44
Given the considerable uncertainty over the value of risk aversion, we present calibration
results for a range of values ￿ = 2;3;4. We choose ￿ = ￿ + 1 for all calibrations, as
would be implied by a CRRA utility function. Table 10 presents results from the numerical
implementation of expression (4). At ￿ u = 6:2% and ￿ = 3, the optimal replacement rate
is 42:8%. At an unemployment rate of 7:5% (roughly one standard deviation above the
mean unemployment rate), the formula implies an optimal replacement rate of 61:4%. Thus,
we see that variation in the unemployment rate can substantially a⁄ect replacement rates.
The basic lesson to emerge from the table is that plausible variation in the unemployment
rate generates wide variation in the optimal level of UI. To give a sense of the quantitative
importance of this variation, the magnitude is roughly equivalent to a one unit change in
43Chetty (2006) shows that this approximation is robust to variation in the ￿nancial environment. In
particular, it does not matter if agents consume hand-to-mouth or have access to liquidity. This result
carries over to our setting; as a result, our welfare analysis will be valid, even with savings and borrowing.
44To prevent degenerate corner solutions to the planner problem, we assume that the true duration elasticity,
", is given by the following formula ^ "(b=(b + ￿)), where ^ " is the estimated duration elasticity. This ensures
an interior solution for all ￿ > 0. We use ￿ = 0:005, which gives virtually identical results for all columns in
Table 10 except for when risk aversion is low (￿ ￿ 3) and duration elasticity is high (^ " > 1), in which case
this modi￿cation raises optimal replacement rate away from 0 by between 1 and 6 percentage points.
32the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion in the model (e.g., from ￿ = 3 to ￿ = 4), holding the
unemployment rate constant. While the previous literature has emphasized the sensitivity of
the optimal UI bene￿t level to the level of risk aversion, our results suggest that the optimal
UI bene￿t level is equally sensitive to labor market conditions. This sensitivity highlights
the value of future work which produces more precise estimates of how the duration elasticity
and e⁄ect of UI on consumption drop at unemployment vary with the unemployment rate.
In terms of existing UI policy in the U.S., the potential duration of UI bene￿ts has
typically been adjusted in response to slackness in the labor market, rather than the level
of UI bene￿ts. Historically, bene￿ts have been extended by 13 weeks when a state￿ s insured
unemployment rate exceeded some threshold (Card and Levine, 2000). In section A.7.1 of
the Appendix, we examine both the expected payout from an increase in the unemployment
bene￿t level that trades o⁄ the gain from consumption smoothing and the cost of moral
hazard and the expected payout from an extension of bene￿ts in line with what we observe
with existing UI policy. Our ￿ndings indicate that the actual UI policy appears to be
slightly less generous in terms of expected payouts as the optimal policy from adjusting the
replacement rate would imply.
In section A.7.2 of the Appendix, we also show how one can use our reduced form empirical
results to shed light on how extended bene￿ts in the great recession (from 26 to 99 weeks)
a⁄ected the aggregate unemployment. Our calculations imply that extended bene￿ts can
account for roughly 17% of the observed increase in the aggregate unemployment rate during
the great recession in the U.S.. We emphasize that these stylized calculations are primarily
meant to be illustrative and that considerable caution should be exercised in interpreting the
quantitative results. Nevertheless, we believe they highlight the substantive importance of
our estimates of how the moral hazard cost and consumption smoothing bene￿ts of UI vary
with the unemployment rate.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we have considered a standard job search model and have shown that the
relationship between both the moral hazard cost and the consumption smoothing bene￿t of
33UI and the unemployment rate is theoretically ambiguous. This motivated our two-part
empirical strategy which (1) estimated how the elasticity of unemployment duration with
respect to the UI bene￿t level varies with the unemployment rate and (2) estimated how the
e⁄ect of UI on the consumption drop upon unemployment varies with the unemployment
rate.
Our empirical ￿ndings indicate that the moral hazard cost of UI is lower when unemploy-
ment is high, consistent with the speculation of Krueger and Meyer (2002) who claimed that
there is likely less of an e¢ ciency loss from reduced search e⁄ort by the unemployed when
local labor market conditions are poor. On the other hand, we do not ￿nd evidence that
the consumption smoothing bene￿t of UI varies with the unemployment rate. We have also
shown how one can use the empirical relationship between the duration elasticity and the
unemployment rate to calibrate a simple optimal UI formula.
We view the concept that the moral hazard cost of social policies may vary with local
labor market conditions as quite general, extending beyond the application of unemployment
insurance considered in this paper. It is plausible that the disincentive e⁄ects of other
government policies may also be lower in times of high unemployment. For example, if the
labor supply response to tax changes is lower during recessions, it may be more e¢ cient to
redistribute during recessions. In the case of disability insurance and workers compensation,
the adverse incentive e⁄ect of such programs may also be in￿ uenced by the business cycle.
It would be interesting to study whether the labor supply elasticities for these programs
vary over the business cycle. More generally, to the extent that the moral hazard cost
of social insurance programs varies with labor market conditions, one should draw caution
in comparing elasticity estimates across studies to the extent that there are di⁄erent labor
market conditions that underlie these estimates.
We conclude with several limitations to our analysis. First, our analysis assumes a
stationary job search environment. If duration dependence in job search is important, this
can drastically change the implications of our results. In ongoing research, we are working
to estimate the role of duration dependence in unemployment, and how duration dependence
varies with labor market conditions.
34Second, our results are based on variation in local labor market conditions. Local re-
cessions and aggregate recessions may have very di⁄erent underlying mechanisms. While
the similarity between our state-level and MSA-level results is reassuring, we believe caution
should still be exercised in extrapolating our results to national recessions.
Finally, while we focused on the UI bene￿t level as the policy parameter, in practice,
the potential bene￿t duration is typically extended during times of high unemployment. In
ongoing work, we are studying theoretically the welfare-maximizing time path of UI bene￿ts
and how this varies with labor market conditions. We hope that this analysis will shed light
on UI bene￿t extension programs in the U.S. and other developed countries.
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37Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Unemployment duration (weeks) 18.510 14.351 16.950 13.605 19.373 14.678 0.000
Average UI Weekly Benefit Amount ($'s) 163.33 26.80 163.08 26.07 163.46 27.21 0.660
Maximum UI Weekly Benefit Amount ($'s) 226.93 45.74 219.57 45.63 231.00 45.30 0.000
Age 37.17 11.07 36.59 11.11 37.48 11.03 0.011
Years of Education 12.17 2.88 12.12 2.87 12.20 2.88 0.372
1{Married} 0.616 0.486 0.609 0.488 0.620 0.486 0.501
Annual wage income ($000's) 20.92 13.57 20.93 13.55 20.92 13.58 0.979
1{Net liquid wealth in 1st quartile} 0.259 0.438 0.260 0.439 0.258 0.438 0.914
2{Net liquid wealth in 2nd quartile} 0.238 0.426 0.232 0.422 0.240 0.427 0.544
3{Net liquid wealth in 3rd quartile} 0.271 0.444 0.273 0.446 0.269 0.444 0.775
4{Net liquid wealth in 4th quartile} 0.233 0.423 0.235 0.424 0.232 0.422 0.842
Number of Spells
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Change in log consumption upon unemp. -0.070 0.415 -0.061 0.402 -0.079 0.427 0.396
After-tax UI Replacement Rate 0.606 0.155 0.599 0.153 0.613 0.156 0.083
Age 34.58 11.44 34.38 11.21 34.77 11.64 0.498
1{Female} 0.233 0.423 0.250 0.433 0.217 0.413 0.129
1{Married} 0.571 0.495 0.565 0.496 0.576 0.495 0.661
1{White} 0.496 0.500 0.495 0.500 0.496 0.500 0.964
1{Black} 0.460 0.499 0.478 0.500 0.444 0.497 0.180
Change in log food needs 0.002 0.255 0.002 0.254 0.003 0.256 0.910
Number of Children Under 18 1.240 1.422 1.223 1.391 1.255 1.449 0.650
Number of Observations
Notes: In Panel A, data are individual-level unemployment spells from 1985-2000 SIPP.  Average UI Weekly Benefit 
Amount and Maximum UI Weekly Benefit Amount and all other dollar values are reported as 2000 CPI-U-adjusted 
dollars.  In Panel B, data are individual-level observations from 1968-1987 PSID.  The after-tax UI replacement rate is 
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Panel A: Duration elasticity sample (SIPP)
Panel B: Consumption change sample (PSID)




















              (1) (2)
log(UI WBA)                   (A) -0.563 -0.228
(0.300) (0.253)
                 [0.060]    [0.368]
log(UI WBA) ×                 (B) 1.262 1.219
   log(State Unemp. Rate / National Unemp. Rate) (0.434) (0.469)
                 [0.004]    [0.009]
log(State Unemp. Rate / National Unemp. Rate) -0.014 0.010
              (0.119) (0.130)
                 [0.908]    [0.940]
Age -0.017 -0.017
(0.002) (0.002)
                 [0.000]    [0.000]
Marital Dummy 0.208 0.211
(0.040) (0.040)
                 [0.000]    [0.000]
Years of Education 0.004 0.004
(0.006) (0.006)
                 [0.505]    [0.491]
Number of Spells 4307 4307
Post-estimation: (A) + σ × (B) -0.304 0.022
              (0.300) (0.239)
              [0.310] [0.927]
Post-estimation: (A) - σ × (B) -0.822 -0.477
              (0.325) (0.299)
              [0.011] [0.110]
Table 2
How Does Duration Elasticity Vary With the 
Unemployment Rate?
Notes: All columns report semiparametric (Cox proportional) hazard model results 
from estimating equation (5).  Data are individual-level unemployment spells from 
1985-2000 SIPP.  All specifications include state, year, industry and occupation 
fixed effects, 10-knot linear spline in log annual wage income and a control for 
being on the seam between interviews to adjust for the "seam effect."  The Average 
UI WBA is the average weekly benefit amount paid to individuals claiming 
unemployment insurance in a given state.  The Maximum UI WBA is the statutory 
weekly benefit amount paid to high wage earners in a state.  All columns estimate 
nonparametric baseline hazards stratified by quartile of net liquid wealth.  The final 
two rows report linear combinations of parameter estimates to produce the duration 
elasticity when the state unemployment rate is one standard deviation above/below 
the mean.  Standard errors, adjusted to allow for an arbitrary variance-covariance 









(1) (2) (3) (4)
log(State Unemp. Rate / National Unemp. Rate) 0.080 0.103 0.117 0.008
(0.050) (0.062) (0.137) (0.088)
                 [0.122]    [0.104]    [0.399]    [0.924]
(log(State Unemp. Rate / National Unemp. Rate))
2            0.100                      
           (0.107)                      
                            [0.355]                      
N 672 672 336 336
log(State Unemp. Rate / National Unemp. Rate) 0.054 0.089 0.127 -0.012
(0.038) (0.046) (0.093) (0.060)
                 [0.167]    [0.062]    [0.183]    [0.842]
(log(State Unemp. Rate / National Unemp. Rate))
2            0.130                      
           (0.093)                      
                            [0.171]                      
N 672 672 336 336
Table 3
How Do UI Benefits Vary With the Unemployment Rate?
Notes: All columns report OLS regressions with the log of the statutory maximum weekly UI 
benefit in the state as the dependent variable.  Data set is state-level panel of the 42 states used in 
the baseline SIPP sample between 1985 and 2000.  Standard errors, adjusted to allow for an 
arbitrary variance-covariance matrix for each state over time, are in parentheses and p-values are in 
brackets.
Panel B: State FEs + Year FEs + State-specific linear trends
Panel A: State FEs + Year FEs
Sample Restrictions:
Dependent variable: Log of Maximum UI Weekly Benefit Amount
Full Sample
40              (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
log(Average UI WBA)                    (A) -0.563 -0.572 -0.706 -0.659 -0.748 -0.593 -0.541 -0.725 -0.553 -0.808
(0.300) (0.329) (0.362) (0.342) (0.324) (0.344) (0.365) (0.361) (0.443) (0.449)
                 [0.060]    [0.082]    [0.051]    [0.054]    [0.021]    [0.085]    [0.138]    [0.044]    [0.211]    [0.072]
log(Average UI WBA) ×                 (B) 1.262 1.270 1.606 1.744 2.584 1.324 2.530 1.435 1.740 1.236
   log(State Unemp. Rate / National Unemp. Rate) (0.434) (0.465) (0.445) (0.477) (1.208) (0.387) (0.902) (0.515) (0.840) (0.547)
                 [0.004]    [0.006]    [0.000]    [0.000]    [0.032]    [0.001]    [0.005]    [0.005]    [0.038]    [0.024]
Quadratic in State Unemployment Rate N Y N N N N N N N N
Cubic in State Unemployment Rate N N Y N N N N N N N
Quartic in State Unemployment Rate N N N Y N N N N N N
State FEs x State Unemployment Rate N N N N Y N Y N N N
Year FEs x State Unemployment Rate N N N N N Y Y N N N
Region-specific linear time trends N N N N N N N Y N N
Region × Year FEs N N N N N N N N Y N
State-specific linear time trends N N N N N N N N N Y
Post-estimation: (A) + σ × (B) -0.304 -0.312 -0.377 -0.302 -0.219 -0.322 -0.023 -0.431 -0.197 -0.555
              (0.300) (0.316) (0.340) (0.317) (0.332) (0.328) (0.372) (0.373) (0.451) (0.475)
              [0.310] [0.324] [0.267] [0.341] [0.510] [0.327] [0.951] [0.248] [0.663] [0.242]
Post-estimation: (A) - σ × (B) -0.822 -0.832 -1.035 -1.016 -1.278 -0.865 -1.060 -1.019 -0.910 -1.062
              (0.325) (0.367) (0.404) (0.390) (0.471) (0.377) (0.443) (0.379) (0.498) (0.450)
              [0.011] [0.024] [0.010] [0.009] [0.007] [0.022] [0.017] [0.007] [0.068] [0.018]
Table 4
Allowing UI Benefits to Respond Flexibly to the Unemployment Rate and Flexibly Controlling for Unobserved Trends
Notes: All columns report semiparametric (Cox proportional) hazard model results from estimating equation (5).  Data are individual-level unemployment spells 
from 1985-2000 SIPP.  Number of spells = 4307.  See Table 2 for more details on the baseline specification and Appendix Table A1 for analogous results usin the 
Maximum UI WBA.  The final two rows reports linear combinations of parameter estimates to produce the duration elasticity when the state unemployment rate is 
one standard deviation above/below the mean.  Standard errors, adjusted to allow for an arbitrary variance-covariance matrix for each state over time, are in 
parentheses and p-values are in brackets.
41             
              (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
log(UI WBA)                    (A) -0.364 -0.877 -0.127 -0.396
(0.292) (0.480) (0.240) (0.214)
                 [0.214]    [0.068]    [0.596]    [0.064]
log(UI WBA) ×                 (B) 0.991 1.284 2.009 0.993 1.382 1.937
   log(Metropolitan Unemp. Rate / National Unemp. Rate) (0.393) (0.481) (0.971) (0.450) (0.530) (1.021)
                 [0.012]    [0.008]    [0.038]    [0.027]    [0.009]    [0.058]
log(Metropolitan Unemp. Rate / National Unemp. Rate) -0.064 0.010 0.078 -0.050 -0.003 0.072
              (0.094) (0.096) (0.157) (0.105) (0.111) (0.154)
                 [0.496]    [0.921]    [0.620]    [0.637]    [0.976]    [0.641]
MSA FEs + Year FEs Y Y Y Y Y Y
State-specific linear time trends N Y N N Y N
State × Year FEs N N Y N N Y
Post-estimation: (A) + σ × (B) -0.082 -0.511 0.155 -0.003
              (0.296) (0.509) (0.230) (0.253)
              [0.783] [0.315] [0.498] [0.990]
Post-estimation: (A) - σ × (B) -0.646 -1.243 -0.410 -0.790
              (0.329) (0.490) (0.309) (0.270)
              [0.050] [0.011] [0.184] [0.003]
Table 5
Exploiting Variation Across Metropolitan Areas Within States
Notes: All columns report semiparametric (Cox proportional) hazard model results from estimating equation (5).  Data are individual-level 
unemployment spells from 1985-2000 SIPP.  Number of spells = 4307.  See Table 2 for more details on the baseline specification.  To 
preserve sample size, observations without MSA codes are grouped together within a state and assigned the state unemployment rate.  The 
final two rows reports linear combinations of parameter estimates to produce the duration elasticity when the state unemployment rate is one 
standard deviation above/below average.  Standard errors, adjusted to allow for an arbitrary variance-covariance matrix for each state over 
time, are in parentheses and p-values are in brackets.




              (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
log(Average UI WBA)                    (A) -0.563 -0.551 -0.563 -0.541 -0.559 -0.488 -0.482 -0.450 0.105
(0.300) (0.296) (0.300) (0.295) (0.298) (0.300) (0.320) (0.304) (0.079)
                 [0.060]   [0.063]   [0.060]   [0.067]   [0.061]   [0.103]   [0.132]   [0.138]    [0.192]
log(Average UI WBA) ×                 (B) 1.262 1.249 1.262 1.255 1.271 1.271 1.212 1.243 -0.313
   log(State Unemp. Rate /  (0.434) (0.435) (0.428) (0.438) (0.430) (0.443) (0.413) (0.407) (0.134)
            National Unemp. Rate )    [0.004]   [0.004]   [0.003]   [0.004]   [0.003]   [0.004]   [0.003]   [0.002]    [0.024]
log(State Unemp. Rate /  -0.014 -0.015 -0.014 -0.013 -0.016 -0.021 -0.021 -0.018 0.117
        National Unemp. Rate ) (0.119) (0.119) (0.118) (0.118) (0.118) (0.117) (0.116) (0.115) (0.023)
                 [0.908]   [0.903]   [0.908]   [0.909]   [0.892]   [0.855]   [0.859]   [0.875]    [0.000]
log(Avg. UI WBA)  ×  Age            0.009                                                        0.010
           (0.008)                                                        (0.010)
                           [0.256]                                                          [0.333]
log(Avg. UI WBA)  ×  1{Married}                       0.003                                             -0.080
                      (0.177)                                             (0.202)
                                      [0.988]                                               [0.693]
log(Avg. UI WBA)  ×                                    0.050                                  0.050
   Years of Education                                  (0.026)                                  (0.028)
                                                 [0.053]                                    [0.079]
log(Avg. UI WBA)  ×                                               0.118                       0.029
   log(pre-unemp. wage)                                             (0.110)                       (0.152)
                                                             [0.283]                         [0.849]
Number of Spells 4307 4307 4307 4307 4307 4307 4307 4307 16322
log(Avg. UI WBA)  ×  Occupation FEs N N N N N Y N Y Y
log(Avg. UI WBA)  ×  Industry FEs N N N N N N Y Y Y
Post-estimation: (A) + σ × (B) -0.304 -0.295 -0.305 -0.284 -0.299 -0.228 -0.233 -0.196 0.036
              (0.300) (0.298) (0.300) (0.296) (0.298) (0.298) (0.311) (0.296) (0.064)
              [0.310] [0.323] [0.311] [0.337] [0.316] [0.444] [0.453] [0.508] [0.579]
Post-estimation: (A) - σ × (B) -0.822 -0.807 -0.822 -0.798 -0.820 -0.749 -0.730 -0.705 0.174
              (0.325) (0.319) (0.324) (0.320) (0.323) (0.328) (0.350) (0.333) (0.100)
              [0.011] [0.012] [0.011] [0.013] [0.011] [0.022] [0.037] [0.034] [0.083]
Notes: Columns (1) through (8) report semiparametric (Cox proportional) hazard model results from estimating equation (5) 
using individual-level unemployment spells from 1985-2000 SIPP.  See Table 2 for more details on the baseline 
specification.  Column (9) reports OLS estimates of take-up elasticity on a broader sample of all individuals deemed 
eligible for UI.  The final two rows reports linear combinations of parameter estimates to produce the marginal effects when 
the state unemployment rate is one standard deviation above/below average.  Standard errors, adjusted to allow for an 
arbitrary variance-covariance matrix for each state over time, are in parentheses and p-values are in brackets.
Table 6
How Much Do Demographics Explain Why Moral Hazard Varies 
with the State Unemployment Rate?
Unemployment Duration
43             
(A) (A) × (B) (B) (A)+σ×(B) (A)-σ×(B)
(1) (A) log(Average UI WBA)  × -0.563 1.262 -0.014 -0.304 -0.822
(B)    log(State Unemp. Rate / National Unemp. Rate) (0.300) (0.434) (0.119) (0.300) (0.325)
                 [0.060]    [0.004]    [0.908] [0.310] [0.011]
(2) (A)  log(Average UI WBA)  × -1.205 0.968 -0.016 -0.236
(B)     1{State Unemp. Rate > Median} (0.359) (0.199) (0.044) (0.313) N/A   
                 [0.001]    [0.000]    [0.716] [0.450]
(3) (A)  log(Average UI WBA)  × -0.520 0.137 -0.001 -0.337 -0.702
(B)    (State Unemp. Rate - National Unemp. Rate) (0.327) (0.069) (0.018) (0.314) (0.363)
                 [0.112]    [0.047]    [0.969] [0.283] [0.053]
(4) (A)  log(Average UI Replacement Rate)  × -0.425 1.425 -0.010 -0.133 -0.717
(B)    log(State Unemp. Rate / National Unemp. Rate) (0.258) (0.506) (0.111) (0.286) (0.269)
                 [0.099]    [0.005]    [0.926] [0.641] [0.008]
(5) (A)  log(Simulated Average UI WBA)  × -0.827 1.232 0.010 -0.574 -1.079
(B)    log(State Unemp. Rate / National Unemp. Rate) (0.352) (0.776) (0.119) (0.344) (0.425)
                 [0.019]    [0.112]    [0.930]    [0.095]    [0.011]
(6) (A)  log(Average UI WBA)  × -0.683 0.866 -0.134 -0.506 -0.860
(B)     -1 * log(Predicted Employment-to-Pop Ratio) (0.402) (1.042) (0.378) (0.318) (0.559)
                 [0.089]    [0.406]    [0.723] [0.112] [0.124]
(7) (A)  log(Average UI WBA)  × 2.833 -1.474 -0.176 -1.056
(B)    Average of log(State Unemp. Rate /  (2.123) (0.514) (0.362) (0.592)
                                  Nat'l Unemp. Rate), 1985-2000    [0.182]    [0.004]    [0.628]    [0.075]
(A')  log(Average UI WBA)  × 1.066 -0.026 -0.466 -0.766
(B')    (log(State Unemp. Rate / National Unemp. Rate) - (B)) (0.467) (0.120) (0.378) (0.361)
                 [0.022]    [0.823]    [0.217]    [0.034]
Hazard Model Results
Notes: All rows report semiparametric (Cox proportional) hazard model results from estimating equation (5); each 
column reports separate parameter estimates.  Data are individual-level unemployment spells from 1985-2000 SIPP.  
Number of spells = 4307.  See Table 2 for more details on the baseline specification.  In rows (1), (2), (6), and (7), the 
median unemployment rate across all states in sample is calculated separately each year.  In row (3), the Average UI 
WBA is the average weekly benefit amount paid to individuals claiming unemployment insurance.  In row (4), the 
Average UI Replacement Rate is the Average UI WBA divided by the average weekly wages in a given state-year for 
prime-age males (computed using the CPS).  In row (5), the Simulated Average UI WBA is constructed following the 
simulated instrumental variables procedure in Currie and Gruber (1996), isolating variation in generosity due to changes 
in program parameters, holding composition of unemployed constant.   In row (6), the Predicted Employment to 
Population Ratio is computed following the "shift share" procedure of Bartik (1991); see text for details.  In row (7), the 
interaction term is split into two separate interaction terms to decompose the variation in the relative unemployment rate 
between within-state and between-state variation.  Across all rows, the final two columns report linear combinations of 
parameter estimates to produce the duration elasticity when the state unemployment rate is one standard deviation 
above/below the mean.  In row (2), we set σ = 1.0 becasue the interaction term includes a dummy variable rather than a 
continuous measure.  Standard errors, adjusted to allow for an arbitrary variance-covariance matrix for each state over 
time, are in parentheses and p-values are in brackets.
Table 7










              (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
UI replacement rate                                         (A) 0.280 0.255 0.257 0.245 0.224 0.244
(0.105) (0.116) (0.115) (0.112) (0.128) (0.116)
                 [0.034]    [0.031]    [0.034]    [0.087]    [0.042]
Implied consumption change at replacement rate of 0 -0.231 -0.253 -0.254 -0.247 -0.237 -0.243
UI replacement rate ×                                    (B)            0.004 0.069 0.027 0.065
   log(State Unemp. Rate / National Unemp. Rate)            (0.213) (0.221) (0.223) (0.232)
                            [0.985]    [0.756]    [0.903]    [0.781]
log(State Unemp. Rate / National Unemp. Rate)            -0.033 -0.080 0.108 -0.095
                         (0.155) (0.178) (0.207) (0.189)
                            [0.833]    [0.654]    [0.605]    [0.617]
N 1604 1595 1595 1595 1595 1595
R
2 0.099 0.099 0.104 0.164 0.114
State and Year FEs Y Y Y Y Y Y
Region-specific linear trends N N N Y N N
Region × Year FEs N N N N Y N
State-specific linear trends N N N N N Y
Post-estimation: (A) + σ × (B) 0.259 0.264 0.232 0.262
              (0.137) (0.131) (0.145) (0.137)
              [0.060] [0.044] [0.110] [0.056]
Post-estimation: (A) - σ × (B) 0.256 0.226 0.216 0.226
              (0.120) (0.122) (0.138) (0.127)
              [0.033] [0.065] [0.117] [0.076]
Table 8
How Does Effect of UI on Consumption Change Upon Unemployment Vary with the 
Unemployment Rate?
Notes: Column (1) reproduces the results from column (4) in Gruber (1997), Table 1.  Remainder of columns report 
OLS results from estimating equation (8) on a replication sample.  Data are individual-level observations from 1968-
1987 PSID.  See text for more details on the baseline specification.  The implied consumption drop is computed as the 
average fitted value across the sample when the replacement rate is set to 0 for all observations.  Standard errors, 








45              (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
log(Average UI WBA)                    (A) -0.563 -0.674 -0.563                      
(0.300) (0.452) (0.289)                      
                 [0.060]    [0.136]    [0.052]                      
log(Average UI WBA) ×                 (B) 1.262 1.520 1.427 1.494 1.720
   log(State Unemp. Rate / National Unemp. Rate) (0.434) (0.729) (0.466) (0.481) (0.593)
                 [0.004]    [0.037]    [0.002]    [0.002]    [0.004]
log(Average UI WBA) ×                                             -0.557
   log(State Unemp. Rate / National Unemp. Rate) ×                                             (0.691)
     1{1st and 2nd liquid wealth quartiles}                                                [0.420]
Number of Spells 4307 2170 4307 4307 4307
3rd and 4th liquid wealth quartiles only N Y N N N
Occupation FEs × Liquid wealth quartile N N Y Y Y
Industry FEs × Liquid wealth quartile N N Y Y Y
log(Average UI WBA) × Liquid wealth quartile N N N Y Y
Post-estimation: (A) + σ × (B) -0.304 -0.363 -0.270
              (0.300) (0.455) (0.295)
              [0.310] [0.426] [0.359]
Post-estimation: (A) - σ × (B) -0.822 -0.986 -0.855
              (0.325) (0.495) (0.315)
              [0.011] [0.047] [0.007]
Table 9
Moral Hazard and Net Liquid Wealth
Notes: All columns report semiparametric (Cox proportional) hazard model results from estimating equation 
(5).  Data are individual-level unemployment spells from 1985-2000 SIPP.  See Table 2 for more details on 
the baseline specification.  The final two rows reports linear combinations of parameter estimates to produce 
the duration elasticity when the state unemployment rate is one standard deviation above/below average.  
Standard errors, adjusted to allow for an arbitrary variance-covariance matrix for each state over time, are in 
parentheses and p-values are in brackets.
46u 3.6% 4.9% 6.2% 7.5% 8.8%
1.249 0.860 0.563 0.323 0.121
r* 0.8% 2.3% 17.7% 44.8% 73.1%
b* $3 $8 $62 $157 $256
r* 6.4% 23.8% 42.8% 61.4% 80.3%
b* $22 $83 $150 $215 $281
r* 26.5% 42.0% 56.2% 70.0% 83.9%
b* $93 $147 $197 $245 $293
Table 10
Sufficient Statistics Calibrations: 
Optimal UI and the Unemployment Rate
Notes:  All columns report optimal UI benefit levels at various 
levels of the unemployment rate.  Subsequent rows report the 
elasticity of unemployment duration with respect to UI benefit level, 
the optimal UI benefit level (b*) and the optimal UI replacement 
rate (r*).  The optimal replacement rate is computed by dividing UI 
benefit level by the average wage.  See Section 4 for more details on 
the computations.  The optimal benefit level is computed assuming a 
weekly wage of $350.
Panel A: Coefficient of Relative Risk Aversion, γ = 2
Panel B: Coefficient of Relative Risk Aversion, γ = 3
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Optimal Benefit Level (b*)
Figure 1: Model Simulation
Reservation wage, no search effort model
Notes: This ﬁgure is generated by calibrating the job search model in the main text with the
following parameters. The beneﬁt level is set to b = 0.0667. The wage distribution is assumed to
be log-normal with mean 0.1 and standard deviation of 0.05. There is no discounting and interest
rate is set to 0 (i.e., r = ρ = 0). The job oﬀer arrival rate is λ(e,α) = α; i.e., there is no search
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Duration Elasticity (dlog(D)/dlog(b))
Optimal Benefit Level (b*)
Figure 2: Model Simulation
Fixed wage, endogenous search effort model
Notes: This ﬁgure is generated by calibrating the job search model in the main text with the
following parameters. The beneﬁt level is set to b = 0.125. The wage distribution is degenerate
with mean 0.25. The beneﬁt level is set to 0.125. There is no discounting and interest rate is set
to 0 (i.e., r = ρ = 0). The job oﬀer arrival rate is λ(e,α) = Λeα, with Λ = 0.1. The cost of search
is φeκ, with φ = 0.3 and κ = 2.1. The job separation rate is s = 0.0089. The coeﬃcient of relative
risk aversion is γ = 3.0.
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Figure 3
Survival Curves Under High Unemployment Rate
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Figure 4
Survival Curves Under Low Unemployment Rate
Notes: Data are individual-level unemployment spells from 1985-2000 SIPP. Each ﬁgure plots
(Kaplan-Meier) survival curves for two groups of individuals based on whether or not Average
UI Weekly Beneﬁt Amount (WBA) in individual’s state is above or below the median. The sur-
vival curves are adjusted following Chetty (2008), which parametrically adjusts for “seam eﬀect”
by ﬁtting a Cox proportional hazard model with a seam dummy and then recovering the baseline
hazard.
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